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Abstract
We study issues of robustness in the context of Quantitative Risk Management and
Optimization. Depending on the underlying objectives, we develop a general methodology
for determining whether a given risk measurement related optimization problem is robust.
Motivated by practical issues from financial regulation, we give special attention to the two
most widely used risk measures in the industry, Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall
(ES). We discover that for many simple representative optimization problems, VaR generally
leads to non-robust optimizers whereas ES generally leads to robust ones. Our results thus
shed light from a new angle on the ongoing discussion about the comparative advantages of
VaR and ES in banking and insurance regulation. Our notion of robustness is conceptually
different from the field of robust optimization, to which some interesting links are discovered.
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1
1 Introduction
The main focus of this paper is the study of robustness properties of optimization procedures
within Quantitative Risk Management (QRM). For this, we introduce a novel general framework,
which at the same time is conceptually intuitive and mathematically challenging. A key and,
as we will highlight in the paper, novel, question concerns the influence of the choice of the
underlying objective on the resulting robustness properties in risk optimization. In particular,
we are interested in the two most popular regulatory risk measures, the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and
the Expected Shortfall (ES), and their robustness properties in the context of risk optimization.
In QRM, the concept of robustness for risk measures is traditionally studied at the level of
objective functionals without involving optimization problems; see Cont et al. (2010), Kou et al.
(2013), Kra¨tschmer et al. (2014, 2017), Embrechts et al. (2015), and the references therein. In
the literature on robust optimization (see e.g. Ben-Tal et al. (2009)), model uncertainty is typi-
cally incorporated through modifying the objective functional or the constraints.
Our setup is different from the above perspectives; it builds on the simple observation that
a risk measure as a standalone function may be robust, but fail to have desirable robustness
properties when this measure is used within an optimization context. To briefly illustrate our
ideas, suppose that a risk factor is represented by a random variable X arising from a stochastic
model, later in the paper, X will denote a random vector. An investor has to optimize her
position according to the best of her knowledge, and hence we shall refer to X as the best-of-
knowledge model, and the true model, denoted by Z, is typically unknowable. Ideally, a good
model X is close to Z in a sense to be made clear later. Based on the best-of-knowledge model X
and an objective functional ρ, an optimized position is chosen as a function g(X) of X . Whereas
the position g(X) may have a desirable objective value ρ(g(X)), this does not guarantee that
ρ(g(Z)) is also desirable if Z is “slightly” different from X . In the absence of a perfect model,
which almost always is the case in financial applications, this issue becomes crucially important.
In the present paper, we put this observation into a rigorous quantitative framework.
The paper Cont et al. (2010) compares the qualitative robustness of VaR and coherent
risk measures; the authors conclude that VaR is better in their context. Some later papers,
e.g. Embrechts et al. (2015) and Kra¨tschmer et al. (2014, 2017), put the corresponding argu-
ments into a different perspective, showing that ES also has certain desirable robustness prop-
erties. Both streams of research assumed that both VaR and, say, ES are applied to the same
financial position. In reality, however, the regulatory choice of a particular risk measure creates
certain incentives, just like any other aspect of regulation. These incentives become effective
even before that risk measure has ever been applied in a risk management context. For instance,
once a specific risk measure has been chosen, portfolios will be optimized with respect to that
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risk measure. Thus, in reality, VaR and ES will will typically not be applied to the same position.
Therefore, one cannot decouple the technical properties of a chosen risk measure from the incen-
tives it creates. In our current paper, we make a first attempt of taking the effects created by
such incentives into account. As an important, and perhaps somewhat surprising consequence,
we arrive at completely different conclusions concerning robustness properties than the previous
literature.
The contribution and the structure of the paper are outlined below. In Section 2, we in-
troduce the theoretical framework of robustness properties of risk measures in the context of
optimization problems, referred to as ’robustness in optimization’ throughout the paper. The
framework is quite general and it includes many practical problems in various fields of applica-
tions, not necessarily confined to finance and insurance. In Section 3, some preliminary results
connecting robustness and continuity are presented. Keeping the problem of risk measures in
mind, several representative optimization problems are listed in Section 4. As one of our contri-
butions, we provide analytical solutions to these optimization problems in Sections 5 and 6 for
VaR and ES, respectively. From our results, we shall see that, indeed, for the case of VaR which
is argued by many as a robust risk measure, its corresponding optimization is highly non-robust
and a small model uncertainty would ruin the optimality of the optimized positions. For the case
of ES the optimized positions are generally robust. In Section 7, we present some discussions
on the implications of our results for the desirability of specific regulatory risk measures, an on-
going debate in the financial industry (BCBS (2016), IAIS (2014)). Our results yield a (further)
strong argument against using VaR as a risk measure within banking and insurance regulation;
for a related discussion on robustness in the realm of risk sharing, see Embrechts et al. (2018). In
the last section, Section 8, we discuss our notion of robustness in the context of distributionally
robust optimization (e.g. Natarajan et al. (2008), Goh and Sim (2010)). The proofs of all results
are put in the appendix.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Notation
We work with an atomless probability space (Ω,F ,P). Let Lq be the set of all random
variables in (Ω,F ,P) with finite q-th moment, q ∈ (0,∞), L0 be the space of all P-a.s. finite
random variables, and L∞ the set of all essentially bounded elements of L0. For a positive integer
n, write Lqn = (L
q)n. For a vector x ∈ Rn, |x| is its Euclidean norm. Throughout, for anyX ∈ L0,
FX represents the distribution function of X . The mappings ess-inf(·) and ess-sup(·) on L
0 stand
for the essential infimum and the essential supremum of a random variable, respectively. We
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write X
d
= Y if the random variables X and Y have the same distribution under P. For x ∈ R,
denote by δx the point-mass probability measure at x.
2.2 Basic setup of optimization problems
In this section, we first lay out the basic setup for optimization problems when the relevant
information on the underlying economic model is known precisely, that is, the case without
model uncertainty. Let X be an n-dimensional random vector, where n is a positive integer.
The random vector X is called an economic vector, which includes all random sources in an
economic model under study, such as potential losses, traded securities, hedging instruments,
insurance contracts, macro economic factors, or pricing densities.
Let Gn be the set of measurable functions mapping R
n to R. A random variable g(X) where
g ∈ Gn represents a risky position of an investor, in which positive values represent a loss and
negative values represent a gain. This sign convention is in line with the regulatory angle we
follow in several applications in our paper. The investor’s problem is to choose among admissible
positions g(X) for some functions g in an admissible set G ⊂ Gn.
For a set G ⊂ Gn, we formulate the problem
to minimize: ρ(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G, (1)
where ρ is an objective functional mapping a set containing {g(X) : g ∈ G} to R ∪ {+∞}. Here
one prefers a smaller value of the objective functional over a larger value. Objective functionals
considered may be general; examples include (up to a sign change) mean-variance functionals,
expected utilities, rank-dependent utility functionals, functionals in cumulative prospect theory,
and various risk measures as discussed in Artzner et al. (1999) and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2016).
Our main interest will be, however, in the risk measures Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected
Shortfall (ES1).
The elements in the optimization problem (1) can be summarized by an objective functional
ρ and a pair (X,G). We always assume that the domain of the objective functional ρ contains
{g(X) : g ∈ G}, otherwise (1) is meaningless.
Example 1. An illustrative example is the classic problem of hedging in a financial market.
Suppose that an investor currently faces a risk W and would like to hedge against W . She
1A formal definition of VaR and ES is given in Section 4. ES is also known as CVaR, CTE, AVaR and
TVaR, depending on the context (see e.g. Pflug and Werner (2007), McNeil et al. (2015) and Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2016)). We use the term ES to be consistent with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS (2016)),
because our study is motivated by the comparative advantages of VaR and ES in regulation; see discussions in
Section 7.
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has access to hedging instruments in a set {g(Y ) : g ∈ G′} where Y is an (n− 1)-dimensional
economic vector and, say, G′ ⊂ Gn−1, n > 2. Typically, the set G
′ involves a budget constraint.
Equivalently, she chooses risky positions in the set {W − g(Y ) : g ∈ G′}, which represents all
possible hedged positions she may attain. Note that {W − g(Y ) : g ∈ G′} = {f(X) : f ∈ G}
where X = (W,Y ) is an n-dimensional random vector and
G = {f ∈ Gn : f(w, y) = w − g(y), g ∈ G
′, w ∈ R, y ∈ Rn−1};
therefore the hedging problem is a special case of our general setting (1). Here we allow W to
be arbitrarily dependent on Y . If W is a financial risk and Y is the vector of asset prices in a
complete financial market, then it may be that W is a function of Y . On the other hand, if W
represents a property and casualty insurance risk and Y is the vector of asset prices in a financial
market, then it may be reasonable to assume that W and Y are independent. See Remark 6 for
a discussion on how a set of more specific optimization problems can be interpreted within the
context of a complete market model with d assets in continuous time.
Example 2. In Markowitz portfolio selection, a investor wishes to find an optimal allocation
vector w ∈ Rn based on a return vector Y ∈ L2n for n stocks. The problem can be described as
the minimization of E[g(Y )] where g ∈ G′ and G′ consists of all functions g ∈ Gn that are of the
form g(y) = λ(w⊤y)2 − w⊤y for w ∈ Rn satisfying
∑n
i=1 wi = x0. Here, λ > 0 is a risk-aversion
parameter and x0 represents the budget constraint of the investor.
In this paper, we keep the choice of (X,G) as generic as possible. Some special cases and
examples are studied in Sections 4-6.
Remark 1. One can also consider continuous-time models where optimizers are chosen over a set
of stochastic processes (e.g. admissible trading strategies). Our discussions apply to such prob-
lems, as long as the optimizers are functions of the random source X , be it finite dimensional or
infinite dimensional. In fact, in many classic financial models, the continuous-time optimization
problem (such as the hedging example above) can be translated into a single-period optimization
problem via the martingale approach; see Fo¨llmer et al. (2009). For the sake of simplicity, we
will focus in this paper on the case of optimization over functions of finite dimensional vectors.
2.3 Uncertainty and robustness in optimization
We proceed to put uncertainty into the optimization problem (1) described above. For
X ∈ L0n, G ⊂ Gn and an objective functional ρ, denote by ρ(X ;G) the minimum possible value
of ρ, namely,
ρ(X ;G) = inf{ρ(g(X)) : g ∈ G},
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and by GX(ρ) the set of optimizing functions, that is,
GX(ρ) = {g ∈ G : ρ(g(X)) = ρ(X ;G)}. (2)
Note that GX(ρ) might be an empty set. Throughout this paper, the notation gX will refer to a
generic element gX ∈ GX(ρ), and gX(X) will be called an optimized position.
We shall use the random variable X to represent our (perceived) model for the underlying
economic vector. In practice, the model X is obtained based on stochastic assumptions and
statistical inference, and it may not represent a true model for the underlying economic vector.
In other words, the optimization problem (1) is often subject to severe model uncertainty. To
reflect this issue, let Z ⊂ L0n be a set of possible economic vectors including X ; Z may be
interpreted as the set of alternative models2. Suppose that the real economic vector Z ∈ Z
is different from the perceived economic vector X . The information we have at hand is about
X rather than Z, and we shall refer to X as the best-of-knowledge model and Z as the true
model, which is unknowable. We have to make decisions according to the best of our knowledge,
that is, as in (2), choosing gX ∈ GX(ρ) optimizing our objective ρ. The real real but unknown
position gX(Z) may be different from the perceived optimal position gX(X). If Z and X are
close to each other according to some (pseudo-)metric pi (e.g. L∞-metric on the space of bounded
random vectors), we would like ρ(gX(Z)) to be close to ρ(gX(X)) in order to make sense of the
position gX(Z), which may no longer be optimal. In other words, we naturally would desire
some continuity of the mapping Y 7→ ρ(gX(Y )) at Y = X .
Note that, in our situation, there is no point in analyzing the problem of optimizing g(Z)
over g ∈ G, because Z is unknown. This makes our framework conceptually different from the
stream of research on stability of the set of optimizers under model uncertainty; see Remark 2
below for an example from financial regulation where we explicit this very important distinction
between our paper and other approaches in the literature.
Putting this into the hedging context of Example 1, suppose that the real economic vector
Z ∈ Z is different from X and an investor has the real risk f(Z) to hedge where f ∈ G. The
information she has is about X , and she hedges from a set of instruments G′ ⊂ G. In this case,
f(Z)− g(Z) is the remaining risk she actually faces after hedging. Under this setting, assuming
the quality of model X is good, Z should be close to X in some sense, and she would naturally
desire some continuity of the function Y 7→ ρ(f(Y )− gX(Y )) at Y = X .
2For instance, Z can be a parametric family of risk models and hence corresponds to parameter uncertainty
of the underlying risk models. Each component of the vector X may have a different economic meaning. Some
of them may be subject to more severe model uncertainty whereas others may be free of model uncertainty. This
can be reflected in the choice of Z which may be contained in a low-dimensional subset of the set of n-random
vectors.
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We also note that, in our framework, the admissible set G is not subject to model uncer-
tainty; the investor knows which positions she can choose in the optimization problem. For
instance, in the above hedging example, a budget constraint that determines G is not affected by
the model assumptions made for X ; it is simply the observed prices for the hedging instruments.
In light of the above consideration, we endow the set Z of all possible economic vectors with
a pseudo-metric pi. Below we give three prominent examples of pi, which will appear throughout
the paper.
(i) For a subset Z of L∞n , the L
∞-metric pi∞n is defined as
pi∞n (X,Y ) = ||X − Y ||∞ = ess-sup(|X − Y |), X, Y ∈ Z. (3)
(ii) For q ∈ [1,∞) and a subset Z of Lqn, the L
q-metric piqn is defined as
piqn(X,Y ) = ||X − Y ||q = (E[|X − Y |
q])
1
q , X, Y ∈ Z. (4)
(iii) For a subset Z of L0n, the pseudo-metric pi
W
n is defined as
piWn (X,Y ) = piP (FX , FY ), X, Y ∈ Z. (5)
where piP is the Prokhorov metric over the set of probability distribution measures
3. In this
case, convergence in piWn is equivalent to convergence in distribution (or weak convergence).
The reason of considering a pseudo-metric instead of a metric is to be able to incorporate cases
such as (5) for objective functionals based on the distributions of risks, for instance, law-invariant
risk measures.
Definition 1. We call (G,Z, pi) an uncertainty triplet if G ⊂ Gn and (Z, pi) is a pseudo-metric
space of n-random vectors. For a given uncertainty triplet (G,Z, pi), we say that an objective
functional ρ is compatible if ρ maps G(Z) = {g(Z) : Z ∈ Z, g ∈ G} to R ∪ {+∞}, and
ρ(g(Y )) = ρ(g(Z)) for all g ∈ G and Y, Z ∈ Z with pi(Y, Z) = 0, i.e. Y and Z are indistinguishable
under the pseudo-metric pi.
Definition 2. Let (G,Z, pi) be an uncertainty triplet. A compatible objective functional ρ
is robust at X ∈ Z relative to (G,Z, pi) if there exists gX ∈ GX(ρ) such that the function
Y 7→ ρ(gX(Y )) is pi-continuous at Y = X .
In this paper, the concept of robustness is always in the sense of Definition 2 and it should
not be confused with the classic qualitative robustness as studied in e.g. Cont et al. (2010),
3Precisely, piP (µ, ν) = inf {ε > 0 : µ(A) 6 ν(Aε) + ε and ν(A) 6 µ(Aε) + ε for all A ∈ B(R
n)}, where Aε =
{x ∈ Rn : ||x− y|| < ε for some y ∈ A} and || · || is the Euclidean norm.
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Kou et al. (2013), Kra¨tschmer et al. (2014) and Embrechts et al. (2015). On the other hand,
in contrast to the robust optimization literature (e.g. Goh and Sim (2010), Wiesemann et al.
(2014)), our focus is the robustness of objective functionals in optimization, instead of how to
solve particular optimization problems. For this, we do not assume specific properties (e.g. con-
vexity) of the objective functionals. As such, our setup and methodology are also different from
classic ones in the optimization literature.
We make a few immediate observations about Definition 2. Robustness is a joint property
of (ρ,X,G,Z, pi), and only a pi-neighbourhood of X in Z matters in the definition. If ρ is robust
at X relative to (G,Z, pi), then ρ is also robust at X relative to (G,Z ′, pi) if X ∈ Z ′ ⊂ Z, and
the same holds true for (G,Z, pi′) if pi′ is a stronger pseudo-metric than pi. On the other hand,
if the optimization problem does not admit a solution, that is, GX(ρ) = ∅, then ρ is not robust
at X .
Remark 2. Let us comment on the relations between our definition of robustness and related
notions in the literature on optimization and model uncertainty. To this end, we consider the
problem of solvency capital calculation of a firm as set forth in the Basel III/IV and Solvency
II agreements. Suppose that Z is the true (but unknown) model and gZ ∈ GZ(ρ); see (2) with
X = Z. In solvency capital calculation, the following quantities have different physical meanings:
• ρ(gX(X)): the perceived risk value (solvency capital requirement) optimized for X by the
firm;
• ρ(gZ(Z)): the idealistic risk value optimized for Z as if Z were known;
• ρ(gX(Z)): the actual risk value of the model Z, but the optimization is made for X .
Among the above quantities, the idealistic risk value ρ(gZ(Z)) represents what would be the
best-case if the true model were known. Since the true model is not known, this value is not
available and hence irrelevant for the solvency capital calculation. Therefore, for solvency risk
management purposes, we are interested in the solvency gap
ρ(gX(Z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
actual risk
− ρ(gX(X))︸ ︷︷ ︸
perceived risk
, (6)
not the optimality gap
ρ(gZ(Z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
idealistic optimum
− ρ(gX(Z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
actual risk
, (7)
nor the optimality shift
ρ(gZ(Z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
idealistic optimum
− ρ(gX(X)).︸ ︷︷ ︸
perceived optimum
(8)
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Note that both (7) and (8) involve ρ(gZ(Z)) which is not relevant for solvency considerations.
In the optimization literature, the continuity of the set mapping Z 7→ GZ(ρ), as well as that of
the function Z 7→ ρ(gZ(Z)), is referred to as the problem of stability, i.e. how do the optimal
solutions and the optimality shift (8) change when the underlying model changes from X to Z;
see, e.g., Bonnans and Shapiro (2000) and the references therein.
Let us further illustrate our notion of robustness by means of the following two examples.
Example 3. Suppose that the model X leads to the unique optimal decision gX(x) = x0 ∈ R,
which means fully liquidating this asset or a perfect hedge (such a situation will arise, e.g., in
the context of Proposition 6). In this case, gX is a constant function, and hence Z 7→ ρ(gX(Z))
is a constant mapping, thus always robust according to our definition. In other words, the
solvency gap (6) will be zero, no matter what the optimizer for the true risk Z is. Hence, model
uncertainty is irrelevant for the calculation of the solvency capital. On the other hand, if the
true model Z is not equal to X and liquidating the asset is not optimal for Z, then we have
ρ(gZ(Z)) < x0; thus the optimality shift (8) will be strictly negative. Therefore, the solvency
gap in (6) is the right notion to look at in this scenario, not the optimality shift.
Example 4. Suppose that X and Z are similar in the sense that gX(X) and gZ(Z) are iden-
tically distributed, but gX(Z) and gX(X) are not identically distributed. In this case, we
have ρ(gX(X)) = ρ(gZ(Z)) for any law-invariant risk measure ρ, such as VaRp or ESp, but
ρ(gX(Z)) > ρ(gZ(Z)) = ρ(gX(X)) since gX is generally not optimal for Z. Clearly, the solvency
gap (6) is strictly positive and the optimality shift (8) vanishes. In this situation, the regulator
is concerned about the insolvency issue regarding model uncertainty. Indeed, the true risk value
ρ(gX(Z)) is larger than the perceived risk value ρ(gX(X)), which means that the solvency capital
is insufficient. Note however that there is no gap between ρ(gZ(Z)) and ρ(gX(X)). Therefore,
also here, the solvency gap is the right notion to study rather than the optimality gap.
Remark 3. There are some alternative ways to formulate the notion of robustness in Definition
2. For instance, one may use topologies instead of metrics, or use uncertainty on the set of
probability measures instead of that on the set of random vectors. By choosing appropriate
metrics and topologies, these formulations become equivalent. To keep the paper accessible
to risk management practice, we choose to work with metrics on the set of random vectors.
Another alternative formulation would be to require all (instead of one) gX ∈ GX(ρ) to satisfy
that Z 7→ ρ(gX(Z)) is pi-continuous at Z = X . This requirement would be stronger than the
current Definition 2. Since a main message of this paper (Theorem 1) is that VaR is generally
not robust, the current formulation in Definition 2 yields a stronger argument, as the requirement
for robustness is weaker than the above alternative.
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3 General relations between robustness and continuity
Clearly, the robustness of ρ relies on both some continuity of ρ on G(Z) and some continuity
of functions in GX(ρ). In particular, if GX(ρ) = ∅, then ρ is not robust by definition. In what
follows, we give a few general results where GX(ρ) contains a continuous function. However,
later we will see that in many practical problems, GX(ρ) does not have any continuous elements
for commonly used risk measures such as the Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall; their
robustness properties will be investigated in detail in Sections 5 and 6.
For a bijection g ∈ Gn and a pseudo-metric space (Z, pi) of n-dimensional random vectors,
let (g(Z), pig) be another pseudo-metric space defined as
pig(g(X), g(Y )) = pi(X,Y ) for X,Y ∈ Z.
Proposition 1. Suppose that for an uncertainty triplet (G,Z, pi), X ∈ Z and a compatible
objective functional ρ, GX(ρ) contains a bijection g, and ρ is pig-continuous on g(Z). Then ρ is
robust at X relative to (G,Z, pi).
Next we look at the basic settings of Z = L∞n , Z = L
q
n, and Z = L
0
n, equipped with the
L∞ metric pi∞n in (3), the L
q metric piqn in (4), and the pseudo-metric pi
W
n in (5), respectively.
Proposition 2. Let ρ be a compatible objective functional for the uncertainty triplet (G,Z, pi)
and X ∈ Z.
(i) Suppose (Z, pi) = (L∞n , pi
∞
n ). If GX(ρ) contains a continuous function g : R
n → R and ρ is
pi∞1 -continuous, then ρ is robust at X relative to (G,Z, pi).
(ii) Suppose (Z, pi) = (Lqn, pi
q
n), q ∈ [1,∞). If GX(ρ) contains a continuous and linearly grow-
ing4 function g : Rn → R and ρ is piq1-continuous, then ρ is robust at X relative to (G,Z, pi).
(iii) Suppose (Z, pi) = (L0n, pi
W
n ). If GX(ρ) contains a continuous function g : R
n → R and ρ is
piW1 -continuous, then ρ is robust at X relative to (G,Z, pi).
Proposition 2 provides simple criteria for verifying robustness of some objective functionals
based on continuity of the optimizing functions in GX(ρ). As we shall see in Sections 4-6, for
the popular risk measures VaR and ES, such criteria may not be very useful, as typically the
optimizing functions lack the corresponding continuity. More detailed analyses are needed to
draw meaningful conclusions for such objectives.
4A function g : Rn → R is linearly growing if for some C > 0, |g(y)| 6 C|y| for all y ∈ Rn with |y| > 1. This
property is satisfied by, for instance, Lipschitz-continuous functions.
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4 Representative optimization problems
As mentioned before, the robustness in optimization is a property of a functional, depending
on an uncertainty triplet. Therefore, in order to study the robustness of certain functionals,
we need to specify the functional as well as the optimization problem and the corresponding
uncertainty model.
Our main interest is in the risk measures Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES).
Here, a positive value of Y represents a loss and a negative value represents a gain. The VaR at
confidence level p ∈ (0, 1) is defined as
VaRp(Y ) = inf{x ∈ R : P(Y 6 x) > p} = F
−1
Y (p), Y ∈ L
0,
and the ES at confidence level p ∈ (0, 1) is defined as
ESp(Y ) =
1
1− p
∫ 1
p
VaRq(Y )dq, Y ∈ L
0. (9)
Note that ESp(Y ) may take the value ∞ if Y is not integrable. In addition, we write
ES1(Y ) = VaR1(Y ) = ess-sup(Y ) = sup{x ∈ R : P(Y 6 x) < 1}.
For any p ∈ (0, 1), we summarize some well known robustness properties of VaRp and ESp
below.
1.) VaRp is continuous with respect to convergence in distribution (and hence, (Wasserstein)
Lq-convergence for q ∈ [1,∞]) at X if and only if the inverse cdf of X is continuous at p;
see, e.g., Proposition 7.3.1 in Shorack (2000).
2.) It follows immediately from 1.) and (9) that ESp is continuous with respect to convergence
in distribution on every uniformly integrable subset of L1. In particular, ESp is continuous
with respect to Lq-convergence for q ∈ [1,∞]. On the other hand, ESp is not continuous
with respect to convergence in distribution on any set containing L∞+ .
We concentrate on some simple optimization problems, which highlight the fundamental
differences between the two risk measures above. Let n = 1 and X be a random loss. Suppose
that random losses can be traded on a financial market with pricing density γ. By holding a
risky position g(X), one receives the monetary amount E[γg(X)]. Let x0 represent the budget
of the investor, then the optimization problem is taken over the functions g satisfying the budget
constraint E[γg(X)] > x0.
We consider the following three classic setups of optimization problems in a financial market.
Recall that our optimization problem is to minimize ρ(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G, for some G ⊂ G1.
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(a) An optimal investment or hedging problem in the case of a complete market:
Gcm = {g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0}.
(b) The problem of optimal investing or hedging with a no short-selling or over-hedging con-
straint:
Gns = {g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0, 0 6 g(X) 6 X}.
In this problem, we assume 0 6 x0 < E[γX ] to avoid triviality.
(c) The problem of optimal investing or hedging with a bounded constraint: for some m > 0,
Gbd = {g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0, 0 6 g(X) 6 m}.
In this problem, we assume 0 6 x0 < m to avoid triviality.
Note that Problem (c) cannot be treated as a special case of Problem (b) as X in Problem (b)
not only serves as the constraint but also as the source of randomness in the optimized position
g(X).
We make the following assumptions on X , γ and our choice of the uncertainty (Z, pi).
Assumption A (Global assumptions on optimization problems).
1. X ∈ Z, X > 0 and the distribution of X is has a positive density on its support.
2. The pricing density γ = γ(X) > 0 is a continuous and strictly positive function of X ,
E[γ] = 1, and E[γX ] <∞.
3. (Z, pi) is one of the classic choices (L∞, pi∞1 ), (L
q, piq1) for q ∈ [1,∞), and (L
0, piW1 ).
The assumptions for X and γ are standard; for instance, they are satisfied by the classic
Black-Scholes model of a single asset with terminal price X . Recall that X represents the source
of randomness and hence γ is naturally a measurable function of X . We will use the notation γ
for both the random variable γ(X) and the function γ : R→ R. Assumption A will be imposed
throughout the rest of the paper, and we do not specify X and (Z, pi) unless necessary.
5 Optimization of Value-at-Risk
In this section we discuss the robustness properties of VaRp, p ∈ (0, 1), with respect to
the three optimizations problems (a)-(c). From the results obtained, we shall see that VaR is
generally not robust for these optimization problems. Recall that by the definition of robustness
(Definition 2), in order to show such non-robustness, we have to identify all possible forms of
the optimizing positions. We present the solutions to the optimization problems in Section 5.1
and then our conclusions on the robustness properties in Section 5.2.
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5.1 Solutions to optimization problems
We first look at Problem (a) for VaRp, that is,
to minimize VaRp(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0. (10)
It turns out that a VaR is not robust for any choice of (Z, pi) since the optimization problem
(10) does not have a solution.
Proposition 3. VaRp(X ;Gcm) = −∞. Hence, Problem (10) admits no solution.
Next, we turn toward solving Problem (b) for VaRp, that is,
to minimize VaRp(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0, 0 6 g(X) 6 X, (11)
where 0 6 x0 < E[γX ]. The optimization problem (11) is non-trivial to solve but fortunately it
admits explicit solutions as we will see below. In what follows, let
q = VaRp(X ;Gns) = inf
{
VaRp(g(X)) : g ∈ Gns
}
.
Obviously, q > 0 since g(X) is non-negative.
For this problem, an optimal solution always exists (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A.2). We
summarize the solutions in the following proposition. Two cases are distinguished. If q = 0,
the risk can be completely hedged under the criterion of VaRp. In this case, the solution of
Problem (11) is generally not unique. This case is arguably less relevant, since there is no risk
left according to VaRp after optimization. In the more interesting case q > 0, we identify the
form of all possible solutions to Problem (11).
Before we proceed, we introduce the notion of a uniform transform U of a random variable
Y , which is a uniform [0, 1] random variable such that F−1Y (U) = Y almost surely, where F
−1
Y is
the quantile function of Y , defined as F−1Y (t) = VaRt(Y ), t ∈ (0, 1). For an atomless probability
space, the existence of a uniform transform of any Y is guaranteed. See e.g. Lemma A.32 of
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2016).
Proposition 4. Let U be a uniform transform of (X − q)γ on the probability space (Ω, σ(X),P)5.
(i) q = 0 if and only if ESp(γX) >
x0
1−p .
(ii) If q = 0, a solution of Problem (11) is given by
gX(X) = X1{U>p}. (12)
5Recall our convention of identifying γ with the random variable γ(X). Due to this convention, the random
variable (X − q)γ is the same as (X − q)γ(X).
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(iii) If q > 0, any solution to Problem (11) has the form
gX(X) = X1{U>p} + (X ∧ q)1{U6p}, a.s. (13)
The random variable U in the preceding proposition is defined on the probability space
(Ω, σ(X),P). It can therefore be represented as a function of X , and so the random variables on
the right-hand sides of (12) and (13) are indeed functions of X . To represent these functions in
a more explicit form, we require the following (very weak) continuity assumption, which holds in
particular if (X−q)γ has a continuous distribution, which is in turn the case if γ is an increasing
function.
Assumption V1. q > 0 and P((X − q)γ 6 VaRp((X − q)γ)) = p.
Under Assumption V1, we immediately obtain {U > p} = {(X − q)γ > VaRp((X − q)γ)}
a.s.; we thus obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under Assumption V1, Problem (11) admits a P-a.s. unique solution that is of
the form
gX(X) = X1{(X−q)γ>c} + (X ∧ q)1{(X−q)γ6c}, (14)
where c = VaRp((X − q)γ).
Remark 4. Using (14) and the budget condition E[γgX(X)] = x0, one can (numerically) solve
for the value of q. If there are multiple values of q satisfying E[γgX(X)] = x0, then the smallest
value is the optimum.
Finally, we turn to Problem (c) for VaRp, that is,
to minimize VaRp(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0, 0 6 g(X) 6 m, (15)
where 0 6 x0 < m. The optimization problem (15) is studied by He and Zhou (2011) and it
admits a simple solution, which we briefly present below. In what follows, similarly to Section
5.2, let
q′ = VaRp(X ;Gbd) = inf
{
VaRp(g(X)) : g ∈ Gbd
}
.
Similarly to Problem (b), we present solutions of Problem (c) in the cases q′ = 0 and q′ > 0
separately.
Proposition 5. Let U be a uniform transform of γ on the probability space (Ω, σ(X),P).
(i) q′ = 0 if and only if mESp(γ) >
x0
1−p .
(ii) If q′ = 0, a solution of Problem (15) is given by
gX(X) = m1{U>p}.
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(iii) If q′ > 0, any solution to Problem (15) has the form
gX(X) = m1{U>p} + q
′
1{U6p}, a.s.
In order to establish the unique form of the optimizing functions for Problem (15), we make
the following assumption which is analogous to Assumption V1.
Assumption V2. q′ > 0 and P(γ 6 VaRp(γ)) = p.
Corollary 2. Under Assumption V2, Problem (15) admits a P-a.s. unique solution that is of
the form
gX(X) = m1{γ>c} + q
′
1{γ6c}, (16)
where c = VaRp(γ).
5.2 Robustness of VaR in optimization
Now, we have gathered enough ingredients to establish the (non-)robustness of VaR. In the
following theorem, (Z, pi) is any one of the choices specified in Assumption A. The proof of this
theorem involves some additional results which are given in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1. For p ∈ (0, 1) and X ∈ Z,
(i) VaRp is not robust at X relative to (Gcm,Z, pi);
(ii) under Assumption V1, VaRp is not robust at X relative to (Gns,Z, pi);
(iii) under Assumption V2, VaRp is not robust at X relative to (Gbd,Z, pi).
Theorem 1 implies that, for all three settings of optimization problems and all choices of
commonly used (pseudo-)metrics, VaRp is not robust, and this result holds for a general con-
tinuously distributed random variable X . As a consequence, VaRp has the poorest possible
robustness in the context of optimization. This can already be seen from the form of its optimiz-
ing functions: the optimizing functions gX always have a jump at a p-quantile of gX(X), which
makes it most vulnerable to model uncertainty.
6 Optimization of Expected Shortfall
In this section we discuss the robustness properties of ESp, p ∈ (0, 1), with respect to the
three optimizations problems (a)-(c). From the results obtained, we shall see that ES is generally
robust for these optimization problems, in sharp contrast to the case of VaR. Problems (a)-(c) are
technically completely different for the two choices of risk measures. In order to show robustness
15
of ES, we only need to specify a specific optimizing function and then show its corresponding
continuity. Similarly to the organization of the previous section, we present the solutions to
the optimization problems in Section 6.1 and then our conclusion on robustness in Section 6.2.
Recall again that Assumption A is imposed throughout this section.
6.1 Solutions to optimization problems
We first study Problem (a) for ESp, where 0 < p < 1, that is,
to minimize ESp(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0. (17)
Our first result states that Problem (17) either does not have a solution or has a trivial solution.
The following condition on the essential supremum γ turns out to be crucial for Problem (17).
Assumption E1. ess-supγ 6 11−p .
Proposition 6. Problem (17) admits a solution if and only if Assumption E1 holds, and if
Assumption E1 holds, a solution is given by gX(·) = x0.
If Assumption E1 holds, the solution to Problem (17) is a constant function gX(·) = x0,
which corresponds to perfect hedging of the original financial position X (e.g. through purchase
of an insurance cover). Since the risk is perfectly hedged, there is no model uncertainty in the
optimized position anymore.
Next, we turn toward solving Problem (b) for ESp, where 0 < p < 1, that is,
to minimize ESp(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0, 0 6 g(X) 6 X, (18)
where 0 6 x0 < E[γX ]. Based on Theorem 8.26 of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2016), which is a
slight generalization of a result by Sekine (2004), the form of an optimized position is obtained
explicitly in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. There exist constants c > 0, r > 0, and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that the function
gX(x) = x1{γ(x)>c} + (x ∧ r)1{γ(x)<c} + ((1 − λ)x+ λ(x ∧ r))1{γ(x)=c}, x ∈ R, (19)
solves Problem (18). Moreover, r is a p-quantile of gX(X).
Finally, we turn to Problem (c) for ESp, where 0 < p < 1, that is,
to minimize ESp(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0, 0 6 g(X) 6 m, (20)
where 0 6 x0 < m. The solution to this problem is similar to the case of Problem (18).
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Proposition 8. There exist constants c > 0, r ∈ [0,m], and λ ∈ [r,m] such that the function
gX(x) = m1{γ(x)>c} + r1{γ(x)<c} + λ1{γ(x)=c}, x ∈ R, (21)
solves Problem (20). Moreover, r is a p-quantile of gX(X).
Let us now comment on some possible re-formulations of our optimization problems (17),
(18), and (20).
Remark 5. Consider the following general version of problems (17), (18), and (20), in which risk
profiles of the form g(X) are replaced by general F -measurable random variables:
minimize ESp(Y ) over F -measurable Y with E[γY ] > x0, 0 6 Y 6 Z, (22)
where again 0 6 x0 < E[γX ] and Z ∈ {m,X,+∞}. Suppose that Y
∗ is any F -measurable
solution. Since ESp is monotone with respect to second-order stochastic dominance, we have
ESp(Y
∗) > ESp(E[Y
∗|X ]). Moreover, since Y ∗ satisfies the constraints in (22), then so does
E[Y ∗|X ], due to our Assumption 1.2. Therefore, E[Y ∗|X ] is a solution to our optimization
problem (22). But every σ(X)-measurable functional is of the form g(X) for some function
g, and so there must exist a function gX ∈ G1 satisfying the constraints in (18), such that
E[Y ∗|X ] = gX(X) is a solution of both (22) and the corresponding problem (17), (18), or (20).
This shows that the problem (22) is not much more general than our representative optimization
problems. The same argument works for every law-invariant convex risk measure in place of
ESp.
Remark 6. Our representative optimization problems (17), (18), and (20) connect as follows
with continuous-time optimal hedging problems in a complete market with an arbitrary number
of primary assets. For instance, suppose that S = (St)t∈[0,T ] is a d-dimensional semimartingale
admitting a unique local martingale measure Q with density γ = dQ/dP on F = FST . We can
interpret S as the discounted price process of d risky securities. The fact that Q is unique is
equivalent to the completeness of the model. In this context, it is a natural task to minimize, e.g.,
ESp(X − VT ), where is a VT is the discounted time-T value of a self-financing trading strategy
satisfying a cost constraint on the initial investment V0 and also certain other constraints such
as 0 6 VT 6 X . By martingale arguments, the initial investment satisfies V0 = E[γVT ]. So,
by letting Y := X − VT , we are in the context of the general optimization problem (22). On
the other hand, market completeness implies that S has the martingale representation property,
and so every feasible functional Y can be represented in the form X − VT , where V is again the
value process of some self-financing trading strategy. With Remark 5, we thus conclude that
our representative optimization problems comprise corresponding problems of optimizing over
multi-dimensional dynamic hedging strategies as a special case. In this context, our solution
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function gX may be interpreted as the payoff of a digital or gap option due to a jump in its
graph, which can be replicated through a continuously-adjusted trading strategy in the assets
S1, . . . , Sd.
6.2 Robustness of ES in optimization
To establish the robustness of ES in optimization, we make the following regularity assump-
tion, which is satisfied by essentially all practical models of financial markets with continuous
model space.
Assumption E2. Either γ is a constant, or γ is a continuous function and γ(X) is continuously
distributed.
Theorem 2. For p ∈ (0, 1) and X ∈ Z,
(i) under Assumption E1, ESp is robust at X relative to (Gcm,Z, pi);
(ii) under Assumption E2, ESp is robust at X relative to (Gns,Z, pi) for (Z, pi) = (L
q, piq1),
q ∈ [1,∞];
(iii) under Assumption E2, ESp is robust at X relative to (Gbd,Z, pi).
Comparing Theorems 1 and 2, ES has advantages over VaR in terms of robustness for all
the settings of Problems (a)-(c). In particular, the optimized positions for ES in the settings of
Problems (b)-(c) are non-trivial but they have much better continuity than the corresponding
optimized positions for VaR. Note that Assumptions V1, V2 and E2 impose some continuity
properties on the underlying random variables. These are realistic for most practical models.
Remark 7. Generally, ESp is not robust at X relative to (Gns,Z, pi
W
1 ) for a set Z that is not
uniformly integrable, and this is due to the fact that ESp is not continuous with respect to pi
W
1 ,
as mentioned in Section 4. On the other hand, if Z is uniformly integrable, then ESp is robust
at X relative to (Gns,Z, pi
W
1 ) under Assumption E2, using the same proof as in Theorem 2.
7 Implications for regulatory risk measures
In both the banking and the insurance sectors, VaR and ES are competing regulatory risk
measures for solvency capital calculation; see, for instance, BCBS (2016) from the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision and IAIS (2014) from the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors. In this paper, with the new notion of robustness, we see that in each of the op-
timization problems (a)-(c), VaR is generally not robust whereas ES is. This provides strong
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support for the use of ES in optimization problems, in addition to its convexity which is very
well recognized in the literature. These results further support the transition from VaR to ES
made by BCBS (2016) from a novel theoretical perspective.
Our observations on the VaR vs. ES issue can be explained intuitively. From the results
in Section 5, the VaR optimized positions almost always have a jump at the p-quantile level of
the position, and the optimized position is a bi-atomic distribution which can be interpreted
as a portfolio exhibiting a large loss with a small probability (e.g. selling a large volume of
far out-of-the-money call options). This reflects the fact that “VaR does not capture the tail
risk” as indicated already by many academics and regulators (see e.g. Dan´ıelsson et al. (2001),
Embrechts et al. (2014), Emmer et al. (2015) and BCBS (2016)). If there is model uncertainty
around this p-quantile level, even if small, it ruins completely the optimality of the position.
This can explain the failure of the investment strategies (based on beliefs in small probabilities
of default) of of many of the larger banks before the financial crisis; see, for instance, the report
by Acharya et. al. (2010) on this matter. We note that the optimal positions for VaR and ES
are very similar in their forms (e.g. compare the optimal positions in Propositions 4-5 and
Propositions 7-8). By definition, however, ES does not ignore the values of the tail part of the
optimal allocation (in contrast to VaR), and this explains why the corresponding value of the
risk measure is not underestimated.
There are extensive discussions on the robustness of VaR and ES (although not in the
context of optimization of this paper), and it may be fair to keep a balanced view. One im-
portant issue on the robustness of ES is the difficulty arising from perturbations which yield
probability distributions that may have infinite first moment; this is why in our analysis, ES is
not robust with respect to optimization when the perturbation (uncertainty) to the underlying
probability model is measured by the Prokhorov metric piP . Therefore, in the minimization of
ES from historical data, one needs to always make suitable integrability assumptions, or oth-
erwise minimizing ES may be as problematic as the case of VaR. Infinite mean models are not
of a purely academic nature in risk management; see for instance Nesˇlehova´ et al. (2006) in the
context of operational risk and Weitzman (2009) related to the economics of climate change.
For recent academic discussions on various issues related to the desirability of VaR and ES in
banking and insurance regulation, we refer to Kou and Peng (2016), Fissler and Ziegel (2016),
Embrechts et al. (2018), Armstrong and Brigo (2018) and the references therein.
Our framework can certainly be applied to other settings such as other risk measures (e.g.,
distortion risk measures) or expected utility/loss functions, and other settings of optimization
problems. However, due to our main interest in the comparative properties of risk measures, we
confine our present study to the most practical cases of VaR and ES, and several representative
19
optimization problems. Certainly, there are many future directions to explore on robustness
issues in optimization.
8 Is distributionally robust optimization robust?
We conclude this paper by discussing our notion of robustness in the context of distribu-
tionally robust optimization. The results in Sections 5-6 show that VaR is generally not robust
for the optimization problems (a)-(c). In a classic setting of distributionally robust optimization
(e.g. Quaranta and Zaffaroni (2008), Zhu and Fukushima (2009), Blanchet and Murthy (2018)),
the objective functional itself is evaluated under the worst-case value over a set of possible mod-
els representing uncertainty. By taking the worst-case value of the objective, model uncertainty
is naturally incorporated into the optimization problem. One naturally wonders whether the
robustness properties of risk measures would be improved with such an approach.
To formulate this consideration mathematically, let ρ be a compatible objective functional
for an uncertainty triplet (G,Z, pi) and X ∈ Z. We look at the following optimization problem,
which is a robust version of (1),
to minimize: sup
pi(Y,X)6ε
ρ(g(Y )) subject to g ∈ G, (23)
where ε > 0. Denote by GX(ρ, ε) the set of functions g ∈ G minimizing (23). Clearly, if we
allow ε = 0 in (23), then GX(ρ, 0) = GX(ρ) and we are back in the setting of Section 2. In the
problem (23), an investor is interested in the risk measure value ρ(g(Z)) of the risky position
g(Z), in which Z is the unknowable true model. Therefore, similarly to Definition 2, we say that
the objective functional ρ is robust for the setting (23) if there exists g ∈ GX(ρ, ε) such that the
function Z 7→ ρ(g(Z)) is pi-continuous at Z = X .
Unfortunately, the minimax problem (23) is not easy to solve analytically, even for the rep-
resentative settings in Section 4 and in the cases of VaR and ES. Typically, a linear programming
approach has to be applied for such problems. As ESp is already shown to be generally robust
in Section 6, its distributionally robust version is also generally robust; we thus focus on the
question of whether VaRp becomes more robust in this context.
In order to obtain analytic results, we look at a simple setting of Problem (c). Letting
(G,Z, pi) = (Gbd, L
∞, pi∞1 ), we can formulate the problem
to minimize: sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(g(Y )) subject to g ∈ G1 : E[γg(X)] > x0, 0 6 g(X) 6 m, (24)
where 0 6 x0 < m. Similarly to Section 5, let
q = inf
{
sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(g(Y )) : g ∈ Gbd
}
.
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In addition to Assumption A in Section 4, we make the following assumption, which can be seen
as a stronger version of Assumption V2.
Assumption V3. q > 0, 1/2 6 p < 1, X has a decreasing density on its support and γ is an
increasing function of X6.
Fortunately, with Assumption V3, we are able to obtain an explicit form of the solution to
Problem (24), allowing us to compare the corresponding robustness property with the results we
obtained in Section 5.
Proposition 9. Under Assumption V3, Problem (24) admits a solution of the form
gX(x) = m1{x>c+ε} + q1{x6c+ε}, x ∈ R, where c = VaRp(X). (25)
With the solution gX in Proposition 9, the continuity of VaR mentioned in Section 4 implies
that the mapping Z 7→ VaRp(gX(Z)) is pi
∞
1 -continuous at Z = X . As a consequence, VaRp is
robust for the setting (23). This observation is in sharp contrast with Theorem 1, where we see
that VaRp is not robust relative to (Gbd, L
∞, pi∞1 ) under some weak assumptions. Therefore,
at least for the above illustrative example, the modified optimization problem (24) improves
the robustness of VaR. It is unclear how this result can be generalized to other optimization
problems, as analytic results for (23) are rarely available.
Although VaRp becomes robust in the setting (24), its optimizing function takes a similar
form as in Proposition 5, that is, a bi-atomic distribution which results in a big loss with small
probability. Note that if ε approaches to zero, then the above solution gX converges to the
solution in Proposition 5. This type of optimizing functions is highly undesirable and is subject
to considerable model uncertainty if ε is small; see the discussions in Section 7.
A Proofs of theorems and propositions
A.1 Proofs in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. It suffices to show that the function Z 7→ ρ(g(Z)) is pi-continuous. By
definition, for any X,Y ∈ Z, pig(Z)(g(X), g(Y )) = pi(X,Y ). Thus the pig(Z)-continuity of ρ is
equivalent to the pi-continuity of the function Z 7→ ρ(g(Z)).
6The monotonicity of γ as a function of X has a simple economic meaning. Recall that X represents the loss
of an asset. Hence, Assumption V3 requires that the pricing density is larger when the asset has a larger loss.
This requirement is satisfied by classic equilibrium models in the notion of Arrow-Debreu (Arrow and Debreu
(1954)).
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Proof of Proposition 2. (i) It suffices to show that, as k → ∞, Xk → X in pi
∞
n implies that
g(Xk) → g(X) in pi
∞
1 . This is a direct consequence of the Heine-Cantor Theorem (see
Theorem 4.19 of Rudin (1976)).
(ii) Xk → X w.r.t. pi
q
n implies that {|Xk|
q}k∈N is uniformly integrable and that Xk → X
in probability. It follows from the Continuous Mapping Theorem that g(Xk) → g(X) in
probability. Moreover, for sufficiently large c,
E
[
|g(Xk)|
q
1{|g(Xk)|>c}
]
6 CqE
[
|Xk|
q
1{|Xk|>c/C}
]
.
Therefore, (|g(Xk)|
q) is uniformly integrable and, in turn, g(Xk)→ g(X) w.r.t. pi
q
1 .
(iii) It suffices to show that, as k → ∞, Xk → X in pi
W
n implies that g(Xk) → g(X) in pi
W
1 .
This is a direct consequence of the Continuous Mapping Theorem.
A.2 Proofs in Section 5
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that we assumed that X is continuously distributed. Let y =
VaRp(X). We have P(X 6 y) = 1 − p. Write λ = E[γ(X)1{X>y}] > 0. For d < x0 define the
function
gd(x) = d+
x0 − d
λ
1{x>y}, x ∈ R.
Clearly, gd(X) ∈ Gcm because E[γ(X)gd(X)] = d +
x0−d
λ E[γ(X)1{X>y}] = x0. On the other
hand, VaRp(gd(X)) = d. Letting d→ −∞,
VaRp(X ;Gcm) = inf{ρ(VaRp(g(X)) : g ∈ Gcm} = −∞,
and hence (10) does not have an optimizer.
We first verify that Problem (11) always has a solution in the following lemma. This lemma
will be used later in the proofs of Proposition 4 and Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Problem (11) admits at least one solution, and VaRp(X) > q.
Proof of Lemma 1. Define Q through dQ/dP = γ and let µ = Q ◦ X−1. The set Gns is then
a uniformly integrable subset of L1(µ). Let {gn}n∈N be a minimizing sequence for VaRp in
Gns. By the Dunford-Pettis and Eberlein-Sˇmulian theorems (Theorems IV.8.9 and V.6.1 of
Dunford and Schwartz (1958)), there exists a subsequence {gnk}k∈N that converges weakly in
L1(µ) to some function gX ∈ L
1(µ). Since Gns is convex and closed in L
1(µ), we get gX ∈ Gns.
Moreover, weak convergence in L1(µ) implies clearly that the laws of gnk(X) converge weakly to
the one of gX(X). But VaRp is a left-hand quantile and hence lower semicontinuous with respect
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to weak convergence (see, e.g., Exercise A.6.1 in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2016)). This proves that
gX is optimal.
Note that VaRp(X) > 0 since X > 0 is continuously distributed. Let y = (E[γX ] −
x0)/E[γX ] and g(X) = (X − y)+. It is clear that
E[γg(X)] > E[(X − y)γ] > E[γX ]− yE[γ] = x0.
Therefore, g ∈ Gns. By the invariance of VaRp under monotone transformations,
VaRp(g(X)) = max{VaRp(X − y), 0} < VaRp(X).
Thus, q < VaRp(X).
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) ⇐: Let U be a uniform transform of γX on the atomless prob-
ability space (Ω, σ(X),P). Take g(X) = X1{U>p} which is σ(X)-measurable. Then
E[γg(X)] = (1− p)ESp(γX) > x0. Therefore, g ∈ Gns and 0 6 q 6 VaRp(g(X)) = 0.
⇒: Suppose q = 0. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists gX ∈ Gns such that VaRp(gX(X)) = 0.
This implies P(γgX(X) > 0) 6 P(gX(X) > 0) 6 1 − p, which, in turn, implies
VaRp(γgX(X)) = 0. Therefore,
ESp(γX) > ESp(γgX(X)) >
1
1− p
E[γgX(X)1{γgX(X)>VaRp(γgX(X))}]
=
1
1− p
E[γgX(X)1{γgX(X)>0}]
=
1
1− p
E[γgX(X)] >
x0
1− p
.
The result follows.
(ii) This has been seen in (i).
(iii) We give the complete proof in Lemma 2, where the desired result is stated as part (v).
Lemma 2. Let gX be a solution to Problem (11). Assuming q > 0, the following hold.
(i) E[γgX(X)] = x0, that is, the budget constraint is binding.
(ii) If g ∈ Gns has the form g(X) = X1A + (X ∧ q)1Ac for some A ∈ F with P(A) = 1 − p,
then g is a solution to Problem (11).
(iii) gX(X) = X1A + (X ∧ q)1Ac a.s. for some A ∈ σ(X) with P(A) = 1− p.
(iv) The solutions to the problem
to maximize E[γ(X1A + (X ∧ q)1Ac)] subject to A ∈ σ(X), P(A) = 1− p (26)
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are A∗ = {U > p} a.s. where U is a uniform transform of (X − q)γ on the probability
space (Ω, σ(X),P).
(v) gX(X) = X1A∗ + (X ∧ q)1(A∗)c for some A
∗ given in part (iv).
Proof. (i) Suppose that E[γgX(X)] > x0, then there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λgX ∈ Gns and
VaRp(λgX(X)) = λVaRp(gX(X)) < VaRp(gX(X)), a contradiction.
(ii) Clearly, P(g(X) > q) 6 1 − p and hence VaRp(g(X)) 6 q. Therefore, g is a solution to
Problem (11).
(iii) First, note that for any random variable Y , one can write Y = Y 1A + Y 1Ac for some
A ∈ F with P(A) = 1 − p and {Y > VaRp(Y )} ⊂ A. For instance, A can be chosen as
{UY > p} where UY is a uniform transform of Y . From there, we can write gX(X) =
gX(X)1A+gX(X)1Ac , with P(A) = 1−p and gX(X) 6 VaRp(gX(X)) = q on A
c. Since X
is continuously distributed, A can be chosen as a set in σ(X). Let g(X) = X1A+(X∧q)1Ac .
Clearly, g(X) > gX(X) a.s. Moreover, from part (ii), g is a solution to (11). From part
(i), we have E[γg(X)] = x0 = E[γgX(X)]. Together with g(X) > gX(X) a.s., we have
g(X) = gX(X) a.s.
(iv) Note that we can rewrite the objective in (26) as
E[γ(X1A + (X ∧ q)1Ac)] = E[γX1{X6q}] + E[γq1{X>q}] + E[(X − q)
+γ1A].
Therefore, to solve Problem (26), it is equivalent to maximize E[(X − q)+γ1A] over A ∈ F
with P(A) = 1 − p. Under Assumption V1, and by the Hardy-Littlewood inequality in
the form of Embrechts and Wang (2015, Lemma 3.1), the solutions to this problem are
A∗ = {U > p} a.s.
(v) From part (iii), we know gX(X) = X1A + (X ∧ q)1Ac a.s. for some A ∈ σ(X) with
P(A) = 1 − p. Define g(X) = X1A∗ + (X ∧ q)1(A∗)c , where A
∗ is given in part (iv). By
part (iv), E[γg(X)] > E[γgX(X)] = x0. Hence, g ∈ Gns, and using part (ii), we know that
g is a solution to (11). Furthermore, using part (i), E[γg(X)] = x0 = E[γgX(X)]. Since
E[γg(X)] = E[γgX(X)], by part (iv) again, A maximizes the objective in Problem (26).
Therefore, A = A∗ and g(X) = gX(X) a.s.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) This follows from the same proof of Proposition 4 (i).
(ii) It can be easily checked that VaRp(gX(X)) = 0 and gX ∈ Gbd.
(iii) The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4 (iii).
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To show Theorem 1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let φ : R → R be a measurable function and a ∈ R such that P(φ(X) 6 a) =
p ∈ (0, 1). There exists a sequence {Zn}n∈N ⊂ Z such that the distribution measure of Zn is
absolutely continuous with respect to that of X, Zn → X in pi, and P(φ(Zn) 6 a) < p.
Proof. Let R be the range of X and B = {x ∈ R : φ(x) > a}. Note that B 6= R since
P(X ∈ B) = 1− p < 1. Fix ε > 0.
(i) Assume that there exists a uniform random variable Uε on [−ε, ε] and independent of X .
Let
Xε = X1{X∈B}∪{X+Uε 6∈R} + (X + Uε)1{X 6∈B}∩{X+Uε∈R}. (27)
By Assumption A, X is has positive density over R, and Xε also has density over R. Hence,
the distribution measure of Xε is absolutely continuous with respect to that of X . It is
easy to see that |Xε −X | 6 ε, and
P(φ(Xε) > a) = P(Xε ∈ B) > P(X ∈ B) + P (X + Uε ∈ B, X 6∈ B) > 1− p.
(ii) If there does not exist a uniform random variable independent of X , we extend the original
probability space to allow for such a random variable, and define Xε via (27). Then, we
define Xˆε = F
−1
Xε
(FX(X)) where F
−1
Xε
is the quantile function of Xε. Now Xˆε is well defined
in the probability space (Ω,F ,P). By the facts that, || · ||∞ is monotone in convex order,
and Xˆε−X is smaller than Xε−X in convex order (see e.g. Corollary 3.28 of Ru¨schendorf
(2013)), we have
||Xˆε −X ||∞ 6 ||Xε −X ||∞ 6 ε.
In either cases (i) or (ii), taking Zn = X1/n, n ∈ N, we complete the proof of the lemma for
the metric pi = pi∞1 , which is the strongest metric among choices specified in Assumption A.
Therefore, the lemma holds for all choices of (Z, pi) in Assumption A.
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) This statement follows directly from Proposition 3.
(ii) Let µX be the distribution measure of X and c = VaRp((X − q)γ). First, we verify c > 0.
Note that if c 6 0, then Assumption V1 would imply P(X − q 6 0) > p, which, together
with q < VaRp(X), conflicts the density assumption of X in Assumption A. Hence, c > 0.
Consider the set A = {x ∈ [q,∞) : (x− q)γ(x) > c}. Since γ is a continuous function, it is
locally bounded at q, which means that there exists ε > 0 such that A ⊂ [q + ε,∞).
By Lemma 3, there exists a non-negative sequence of random variables in Z, Zn → X
in pi, such that Zn has a distribution measure absolutely continuous with respect to µX ,
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and P(γ(Zn)(Zn − q) > c) = P(Zn ∈ A) > 1 − p. Since Zn > q + ε if Zn ∈ A, and
P(Zn ∈ A) > 1− p, we have VaRp(Zn1{Zn∈A}) > q + ε.
For gX ∈ Gns(X,VaRp), from Corollary 1 we know
gX(x) = x1{γ(x)(x−q)>c} + (x ∧ q)1{γ(x)(x−q)6c}, µX -a.s.
We have
gX(Zn) = Zn1{γ(Zn)(Zn−q)>c} + (Zn ∧ q)1{γ(Zn)(Zn−q)6c} a.s.
It follows that
VaRp(gX(Zn)) > VaRp(Zn1{γ(Zn)(Zn−q)>c}) = VaRp(Zn1{Zn∈A}) > q + ε.
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
VaRp(gX(Zn)) > q + ε > q = VaRp(gX(X)) (28)
so that the mapping Z 7→ VaRp(gX(Z)) is not continuous at Z = X with respect to pi
∞
1 .
(iii) This case similar to (ii) but slightly simpler. Let c = VaRp(γ). Note that q < m since
E[γgX(X)] = x0 < m (see Lemma 2 (i)). By Lemma 3, there exists a non-negative sequence
of random variables in Z, Zn → X in pi, such that P(γ(Zn) > c) > 1 − p. Therefore,
VaRp(m1{γ(Zn)>c}) = m. For gX ∈ Gns(X,VaRp), from Corollary 2 we know
gX(x) = m1{γ(x)>c} + q1{γ(x)6c}, µX -a.s.,
where µX is the distribution measure of X . Since Zn has a distribution measure absolutely
continuous with respect to µX , we have
gX(Zn) = m1{γ(Zn)>c} + q1{γ(Zn)6c} a.s.
It follows that
VaRp(gX(Zn)) = VaRp(m1{γ(Zn)(Zn−q)>c}) = m.
Noting that VaRp(gX(X)) = q < m, we have
lim
n→∞
VaRp(gX(Zn)) > VaRp(gX(X)) (29)
so that the mapping Z 7→ VaRp(gX(Z)) is not continuous at Z = X with respect to pi
∞
1 .
A.3 Proofs in Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6. By the dual representation of ESp (e.g. Theorem 8.14 of McNeil et al.
(2015)), we have
ESp(Y ) = sup
B∈Bp
E[BY ] for all Y ∈ L1,
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where Bp = {B ∈ L
∞ : E[B] = 1, 0 6 B 6 11−p}. If ess-supγ 6
1
1−p , then γ ∈ Bp, and hence for
any g ∈ Gcm, ESp(g(X)) > E[γg(X)] > x0. Clearly, taking the constant function gX(·) = x0 we
have gX ∈ Gcm and ESp(gX(X)) = x0. Therefore, gX is a solution to Problem (17).
If ess-supγ > 11−p , let y = E[γ1{γ(X)> 11−p }] > 0 and k = ESp(1{γ(X)>
1
1−p
}). Note that
k = ESp
(
1{γ(X)> 1
1−p
}
)
= sup
B∈Bp
E[B1{γ(X)> 1
1−p
}]
6
1
1− p
E[1{γ(X)> 1
1−p
}] < E[γ1{γ(X)> 1
1−p
}] = y.
For λ > 0, take gλ(x) = λ1{γ(x)> 1
1−p
}−λy+x0, x ∈ R. It is clear that E[γgλ(X)] = λy−λy+x0 =
x0, and hence gλ ∈ Gcm. We can calculate
ESp(gλ(X))− E[γgλ(X)] = λ
(
ESp
(
1{γ(x)> 1
1−p
}
)
− y
)
= λ(k − y).
Letting λ→∞, we get
inf{ESp(g(X)) : g ∈ Gcm} = −∞,
and hence there is no solution to Problem (17).
Proof of Proposition 7. The result follows from Theorem 8.26 of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2016). The
fact that r is a p-quantile of gX(X) is stated in the proof of Theorem 8.26 in Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2016).
Proof of Proposition 8. Similarly to Proposition 7, the result follows from Theorem 8.26 of
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2016).
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) Since an optimal allocation is a constant function, it is not subject to
any model uncertainty, that is, g(Z) = g(X) for all Z ∈ Z.
(ii) It suffices to show the statement for (Z, pi) = (L1, pi11) since the statement for (Z, pi) =
(Lq, piq1) for q ∈ (1,∞] is weaker. Let {Zn}n∈N ⊂ L
1 be a sequence of random variable such
that Zn → X in L
1. We will show gX(Zn) → gX(X) in L
1 for some gX which optimizes
(18).
(1) Assume γ is constant. By Proposition 7, for some r > 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1], the function
gX ,
gX(x) = (1− λ)x + λ(x ∧ r), x ∈ R,
solves (18). Clearly, gX(Zn)→ gX(X) in L
1.
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(2) Assume γ is a continuous function and γ(X) is continuously distributed. Let gX be
given by (18) with some constants c > 0, r > 0, and λ ∈ [0, 1]. First, by the Continuous
Mapping Theorem, γ(Zn)→ γ(X) in probability. For all ε ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0,
P
(∣∣1{γ(Zn)<c} − 1{γ(X)<c}∣∣ > ε) = P (1{γ(Zn)<c} 6= 1{γ(X)<c})
= P (γ(Zn) < c, γ(X) > c) + P (γ(Zn) > c, γ(X) < c)
6 P(|γ(Zn)− γ(X)| > δ) + P(γ(X) ∈ [c− δ, c+ δ])
→ P(γ(X) ∈ [c− δ, c+ δ]) as n→∞.
Since γ(X) is continuously distributed, P(γ(X) ∈ [c− δ, c+ δ]) can be made arbitrarily
small. Therefore, 1{γ(Zn)<c} → 1{γ(X)<c} in probability. Similarly, 1{γ(Zn)>c} →
1{γ(X)>c} in probability. As a consequence, gX(Zn) → gX(X) in probability. Also
note that the L1-convergence Zn → X implies that {Zn}n∈N is uniformly integrable.
Because 0 6 gX(Zn) 6 Zn, {gX(Zn)}n∈N is also uniformly integrable, and hence it
converges to gX(X) in L
1.
Finally, noting that ESp is continuous with respect to pi
1
1 (see Section 4), we have gX(Zn)→
gX(X) as n→∞. Thus, ESp is robust at X relative to (Gns, L
1, pi11). As explained before,
this also implies that ESp is robust at X relative to (Gns, L
q, piq1), q ∈ (1,∞].
(iii) To show the statement for pi = piW1 , it suffices to take a sequence {Zn}n∈N which converges
to X in probability. Note that the sequence {gX(Zn)}n∈N is uniformly bounded. The rest
follows by the same proof of (ii).
A.4 Proofs in Section 8
To prove Proposition 9, we need the following two lemmas. In what follows, we denote by
Aε = {x ∈ R : |x− y| 6 ε for some y ∈ A} for a set A ⊂ R and ε > 0.
Lemma 4. If A ⊂ R is either compact or an interval, then Aε ∈ B(R) and
sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
P(Y ∈ A) = P(X ∈ Aε).
Proof. If A is a compact set or an interval, then so is Aε, which proves Aε ∈ B(R). Next,
for any Y ∈ L∞ with pi∞1 (Y,X) 6 ε, the condition Y ∈ A implies X ∈ Aε a.s. Therefore,
P(Y ∈ A) 6 P(X ∈ Aε), leading to suppi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε P(Y ∈ A) 6 P(X ∈ Aε). To show the opposite
direction of the inequality, it suffices to take Y = fA(X)1{X∈Aε} + X1{X 6∈Aε}, where, for a
compact set A, fA(x) is a nearest point of x in A (to be precise, there can be two such nearest
points; by taking fA(x) to be the lower of the two, fA becomes lower semicontinuous and, hence,
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measurable). In the case in which A is a nondegenerate interval, we fix a point a in the interior
of the interval and let
fA(x) =


a ∨ (x− ε) if x > supA,
a ∧ (x+ ε) if x 6 inf A,
x otherwise.
In both cases, |Y −X | 6 ε, and P(Y ∈ A) = P(X ∈ Aε), leading to the desired result.
Lemma 5. Let ε > 0, p ∈ [1/2, 1), and suppose that X satisfies Assumption V3. If A ⊂ R is a
compact set or an interval satisfying suppi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε P(Y ∈ A) 6 1− p, then
P(X > VaRp(X) + ε) > P(X ∈ A).
Proof. By letting A∗ = (VaRp(X)+ε,∞), the assertion can be rewritten as P(X ∈ A
∗) > P(X ∈
A). By Lemma 4, we have
1− p = P(X ∈ A∗ε) = sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
P(Y ∈ A∗). (30)
If P(X ∈ Aε) < 1−p, we can enlarge A to obtain P(X ∈ Aε) = 1−p. Then x := inf(Aε) satisfies
x 6 VaRp(X) since P(X 6 x) 6 1− P(X ∈ Aε) = p.
We consider two cases separately. First, we assume x > ess-infX . It is from the definition
of x that inf(A) = x+ ε. Hence, (x, x+ ε) ⊂ Aε \A. Also note that P(X ∈ (x, x+ ε)) > P(X ∈
(VaRp(X),VaRp(X) + ε)) since X has a decreasing density and x 6 VaRp(X). Therefore, we
have
P(X ∈ A) = P(X ∈ Aε)− P(X ∈ Aε \A)
6 1− p− P(X ∈ (x, x+ ε))
6 1− p− P(X ∈ (VaRp(X),VaRp(X) + ε)) = P(X ∈ A
∗).
Next, we assume x 6 ess-infX . Since p ∈ [1/2, 1), we have P(X < VaRp(X) + ε)) > p > 1 − p.
Because P(X ∈ Aε) = 1−p and x 6 ess-infX , there exists x0 ∈ (x,VaRp+ε) such that x0 6∈ Aε.
Let x1 = sup{y < x0 : y ∈ Aε}. By the definition of Aε and x1, we have x1 − ε > x and
(x1 − ε, x1) ⊂ Aε \A. Using a similar argument as in the first case, we have
P(X ∈ A) = P(X ∈ Aε)− P(X ∈ Aε \A)
6 1− p− P(X ∈ (x1 − ε, x1))
6 1− p− P(X ∈ (VaRp(X),VaRp(X) + ε)) = P(X ∈ A
∗).
We conclude that, in both cases, P(X ∈ A∗) > P(X ∈ A).
29
Proof of Proposition 9. Take an arbitrary g ∈ Gbd and let a = suppi∞
1
(Y,X)6εVaRp(g(Y )). Let h
be given by
h(x) = m1{g(x)>a} + a1{g(x)6a}, x ∈ R. (31)
For all Y ∈ L∞ with pi∞1 (Y,X) 6 ε, we have VaRp(g(Y )) 6 a. Therefore, P(g(Y ) > a) 6 1− p,
which implies VaRp(h(Y )) 6 a. Thus,
sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(h(Y )) = a.
Note that h ∈ Gbd since m > h(x) > g(x) > 0, x ∈ R. Therefore, for any g ∈ Gbd, we can find
some h ∈ Gbd of the form (31), such that
sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(h(Y )) = sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(g(Y )).
As a consequence, it suffices to search for optimizers h ∈ Gbd of the form (31). Moreover, for such
an h, we have E[γh(X)] = mQ(g(X) > a) + aQ(g(X) 6 a), where Q is given by dQ/dP = γ.
Due to the inner regularity of the law Q ◦ X−1, we can find, for any a′ > a, a compact set
K ⊂ {g(X) > a} such that h′(x) = m1{x∈K} + a
′
1{x∈Kc} satisfies E[γh
′(X)] > E[γh(X)] > x0.
Since P(Y ∈ K) 6 P(g(Y ) > a) 6 1− p for all Y ∈ L∞ with pi∞1 (Y,X) 6 ε, we have
sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(h
′(Y )) = a′.
Let us denote by K the class of all compact set K ⊂ R satisfying P(Y ∈ K) 6 1 − p for all
Y ∈ L∞ with pi∞1 (Y,X) 6 ε. The above argument shows that K is not empty. Define a function
hK(x) = m1{x∈K} + aK1{x∈Kc}, x ∈ R, (32)
where aK ∈ R is such that E[γhK(X)] = x0. The existence of aK is guaranteed by P(X ∈ K
c) >
p > 0. Note that 0 < aK < m since x0 < m and q > 0.
The preceding argument shows that it is sufficient to construct a function h∗ such that
E[γh∗(X)] = x0 and
sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(h
∗(Y )) 6 sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(hK(Y )) = aK , (33)
for all K ∈ K . We define h∗ by
h∗(x) = m1{x>c+ε} + a
∗
1{x6c+ε}, x ∈ R,
where a∗ 6 m is such that E[γh∗(X)] = x0. Now let K ∈ K be given and hK of the form (32).
We take k ∈ R such that P(X > k) = P(X ∈ K). Lemma 5 gives P(X > c+ ε) > P(X ∈ K) =
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P(X > k) and hence k > c + ε. Moreover, since γ is an increasing function of X , the upper
Hardy–Littlewood inequality, in the form of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2016, Theorem A.28), yields
x0 6 E[γhK(X)] 6 E[γ · (m1{X>k} + aK1{X6k})] 6 E[γ · (m1{X>c+ε} + aK1{X6c+ε})].
Our condition E[γh∗(X)] = x0 therefore yields aK > a
∗. Since, moreover, by construction,
sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(h
∗(Y )) = a∗ and sup
pi∞
1
(Y,X)6ε
VaRp(hK(Y )) = aK ,
we conclude that (33) holds and that h∗ is hence a solution to Problem (24).
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